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Blessed and cursed by a Congress that gives it
a virtual if not literal blank check for fire protec-
tion, the Forest Service’s fire spending is out of
control. Prodded by a centralized planning and
budgeting process, the agency’s expensive, one-
size-fits-all approach to wildfire does not fit the
extremely diverse 193 million acres of national
forests. 
The Forest Service’s program—which consists
of spending close to $300 million per year treat-
ing hazardous fuels and as much as $2 billion a
year preparing for and suppressing fires—will not
restore the national forests to health or end cata-
strophic fire in most of those forests. In many
forests it may do more harm than good.
Forest Service plans are based on the notion
that western national forests suffer from an unnat-
ural accumulation of hazardous fuels. In fact, that
is probably true for no more than about 15 percent
of those forests. The appropriate treatments on the
remaining 85 percent may be as diverse as the
forests themselves. 
Significant structural changes in the Forest
Service are essential to control fire costs. Those
changes should divorce the agency, or at least its
fire program, from Congress’s blank check. They
should also decentralize decisionmaking so local
decisions will respond to local economic and eco-
logical conditions. 
This paper suggests several possible structur-
al changes, including
• Cost-containment programs (effectively the
current direction);
• Focusing efforts on the wildland-urban
interface, which is mostly nonfederal land;
• Relying on private insurance to fund (and con-
trol the costs of) emergency fire suppression;
• Turning national forest fire control over to
state and local fire protection districts;
• Turning national forests into fiduciary
trusts funded exclusively out of their own
user fees; and
• Abolishing the Forest Service and turning
the lands over to the states.
Because the actual situation varies greatly from
one region to another, it may be that no one of
these solutions will work for all federal lands. To
find the solution or solutions that work best,
Congress should apply some or all of these alter-
natives to one or more national forests on an
experimental basis. Such experiments will help
point the way to future wildfire management.
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Introduction
Like wildfire in dry fuel on a hot windy
day, Forest Service spending on fire is explod-
ing out of control. The agency’s fire expendi-
tures have grown by 450 percent in the last 15
years, and that growth shows no signs of
slowing down (Figure 1). Whereas fire con-
sumed less than 10 percent of the Forest
Service’s budget in 1992, by 2007 it made up
well over 40 percent.1 There are 17 national
forests in California; more than 60 percent of
the 2006 budgets of four of those forests, and
more than 50 percent of six more forests,
came out of fire money.2
For most of the 20th century, the Forest
Service claimed it could largely exclude wild-
fire from the national forests. By the 1960s
that policy appeared to be succeeding; the
number of acres reported burned each year
had drastically fallen from previous decades.
But a series of large fires beginning in 1987
persuaded the agency that fire exclusion was
not feasible.
In fact, the Forest Service has now convinced
Congress that decades of fire suppression have
made federal forests more vulnerable to fire
than ever. Fire suppression, the agency says, led
to an unnatural buildup of fuels that are just
waiting to burn in catastrophic fires. In
response, Congress has rewarded the Forest
Service for its past mistakes by giving it hun-
dreds of millions of dollars each year for haz-
ardous fuel treatments. Just as the Forest Service
once promised to save the forests through fire
suppression, now it promises to save them by
reducing hazardous fuels.
Close scrutiny reveals, however, that the
hazardous fuels story is just as fallacious as the
previous promise of fire exclusion. Although
hazardous fuels are a problem in some west-
ern forests, that problem is far less serious
than the Forest Service claims.
The real purpose behind both the fire-exclu-
sion promise and the fuel-reduction promise
was budget maximization. This is not to sug-
gest that anyone in the Forest Service is deliber-
ately lying to Congress in order to get more
money. Instead, it simply means that natural
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Figure 1
Forest Service Fire Budgets, 1990–2008 (millions of dollars)
Source: Forest Service Budget Justification statements, 1991–2008.
Notes: The Los Alamos fire in 2000 led Congress to greatly increase Forest Service fire budgets, and they have grown
steadily ever since. Suppression funds are actual dollars spent except for 2007 and 2008. Numbers for 2008 are from
the president’s budget, which proposes to reduce presuppression funding; based on early hearings on the budget,
Congress is likely to increase it instead. 
bureaucratic processes lead agencies like the
Forest Service to promote people whose ideas
tend to increase the agencies’ budgets. Those
processes have been particularly visible within
the Forest Service over the last decade.
The rapid growth in fire spending raises
several important questions:
• Is this spending really necessary? 
• Considering that 2004, 2005, and 2006
each saw more acres burn than any prior
year since 1954, is this spending even
effective? 
• Is there any way to control the growth in
fire expenses, or even to estimate what
the optimal level of spending should be?
• Is there a danger that some of the activi-
ties funded by this money are actually
doing more harm than good?
• What will happen to the culture of the
Forest Service, an agency that once prided
itself on multiple-use management, when
most of its money comes from fire?
The Government Accountability Office and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s inspector
general have published numerous reports
encouraging the Forest Service to target its fire
spending more effectively. The Forest Service
itself has published a seemingly endless series
of reports on cost containment. But all of
those efforts are merely tinkering at the edges
of the problem.
This paper will show that the real problem
with fire is not ecological but institutional: Con-
gress has inadvertently designed the Forest
Service fire program to spend more and more
money with little regard to effectiveness or re-
sults. Fixing this problem will require significant
and, for some, painful institutional changes.
This paper will suggest some alternative designs
that could help save taxpayers billions of dollars
and greatly improve federal forest management.
A Budgetary History of Fire
Forest Service fire histories traditionally
focus on the large fires fought by the agency,
starting with the great Idaho and Montana
fires of 1910. But the real history of national
forest fire started two years earlier, when
Congress gave the Forest Service a literal blank
check for emergency fire suppression. 
That blank check was not subject to the
appropriations process that every other feder-
al agency went through. Instead, it allowed the
Forest Service to spend whatever it judged nec-
essary to put out fires. In actual practice, the
Forest Service “borrowed” the money from
one of its other funds, and Congress always
reimbursed that fund at the end of the fire sea-
son. It is unlikely that Congress has ever given
any other federal agency a blank check, and
certainly not one that lasted for seven decades.
At first, national forest managers were
reluctant to use the blank check, considering
it a sign of their failure to exclude fires from
the forests. Records indicate that they drew
upon the blank check only six times in the
first 25 years after Congress passed the law.3
But in 1935 the chief of the Forest Service
issued a directive that greatly expanded the
use of the blank check and made its use rou-
tine rather than exceptional.
First, the directive specified that all funds
expended to suppress fires after 10 AM of the
day after the fires were detected would come
from the emergency fund. Second, the chief
also authorized forest managers to draw
upon the blank-check fund even before a fire
was ignited if drought or other conditions
led them to believe that an emergency might
exist. This money would be used for presup-
pression, meaning purchases of equipment
and hiring and training firefighters.4
All this money for fire control “helped to
bring political power to the Forest Service,”
says Stephen Pyne, a former firefighter and
the nation’s preeminent fire historian.5 “As
that power grew, the Service found itself sub-
tly corrupted in spirit and imagination.”6
The corruption took two forms: a corruption
of the budget and a corruption of the truth.
“The secret to creative financing,” Pyne
writes elsewhere, “is to transfer as many costs as
possible from the budgeted account to the













• 1905: The Forest Service is created when Congress transfers 63 million acres of forest
reserves from the Department of the Interior to Gifford Pinchot’s Bureau of Forestry in
the Department of Agriculture. Eventually the reserves, now called national forests, will
be expanded to encompass 193 million acres.
• 1908: Congress takes the unusual if not unique step of giving the Forest Service a liter-
al blank check for emergency fire suppression. In case of emergency, agency managers
could spend whatever it took to put out a fire, and Congress promised to reimburse the
agency at the end of the year. Also in 1908, Yale forestry Professor H. H. Chapman pub-
lishes research showing that many pine forests in the South rely on frequent light fires
(now called prescribed burning) for regeneration and protection against a buildup of fuels
that could lead to catastrophic fires.7
• 1910: The year of the “Big Blow-Up”—fires in Idaho and Montana that burn three mil-
lion acres and kill 85 people, mostly firefighters. The Forest Service spends almost as
much as its entire annual budget trying to suppress the fires, which Congress dutiful-
ly covers under the blank-check law. Rather than realize that fire exclusion may be
impractical, the lesson the Forest Service learns is that Congress will unquestioningly
reward its fire suppression efforts.
• 1911–1934: The Forest Service draws on emergency fire suppression funds several more
times, initially with “ambivalence,” says fire historian Stephen Pyne.8 But in the long
run, “the money was irresistible.”9
• 1924: The Clarke-McNary Act gives the Forest Service the authority to distribute feder-
al funds to state and local fire protection districts. Influenced by its blank check for fire
suppression, the Forest Service refuses to fund fire protection districts that allow
landowners to use light fires as recommended by Chapman. As a result, most landown-
ers in southern states refuse to join such districts. The Forest Service spitefully records
the prescribed fires they light as wildfires. 
• 1930s: The Forest Service tries to suppress research by other agencies, as well as its own
scientists, that suggests that forests can benefit from prescribed burning.10
• 1935: The chief of the Forest Service directs that all fires be suppressed by 10 AM on the
day after they are detected.11 Historians treat this rule as evidence of the Forest Service’s
obsession with suppression at all costs. But its real significance was that any fire not
suppressed by 10 AM automatically became an emergency, and efforts to suppress those
fires would be covered by the blank-check fund. The 1935 directive also allows local for-
est managers to declare an emergency even before a fire starts if a drought or other con-
ditions would make fires more likely. This allows managers to spend the blank check
on emergency presuppression, that is, fire crews, training, and equipment.
• 1943: Shaken by catastrophic fires in southern forests whose owners had followed the
Forest Service’s advice against prescribed burning, the Forest Service formally reverses
its no-burning policy for longleaf pine.12 Perversely, it refuses to publicize this decision
until after the war, and it does not reverse the policy for the more common loblolly pine
until 1954.13 As a result, many southern landowners do not join fire protection districts
until the mid-1950s—and in the meantime, the Forest Service continues to record their
prescribed fires as wildfires.
• 1950s: The Forest Service begins to use aerial firefighting tools such as helicopters and
air tankers. For the first time, Forest Service firefighting efforts have more than a mar-
5ginal impact on the landscape.14
• 1950s–1960s: Timber sales grow from 3 billion to 10 billion board feet per year, caus-
ing timber to replace fire as the largest part of the Forest Service budget.
• 1975: Forest Service fire-exclusion policies seem to be working, as the number of acres
reported burned each year in the 1960s and 1970s is considerably less than the records
report for the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s. But the Office of Management and Budget
raises concerns that fire suppression costs continue to rise and wonders “what kind of
return we [are] getting for our money.”15
• 1977: Under pressure from the OMB, the Forest Service ends the out-by-10-AM policy
and, for the first time, endorses prescribed burning in the West.
• 1978: At OMB’s instigation, Congress repeals the blank-check law, giving the Forest
Service instead a fixed budget for fire suppression each year, usually $125 million. If
costs one year exceed that amount, the Forest Service is expected to pay those costs out
of one of its revolving funds and then reimburse those funds in later years when fire
costs are lower than $125 million.
• 1979–1986: Responding to the new budgeting process, the Forest Service adopts fire-
fighting strategies that allow more acres to burn in exchange for lower costs and greater
firefighter safety. The result is a large reduction in annual suppression costs from the
previous decade.
• 1987–1988: The new system breaks down when back-to-back severe fire years force the
Forest Service to borrow $422 million from other funds in order to fight fires. 
• 1990: Congress gives the Forest Service a supplemental appropriation to cover 1987
and 1988 fire costs and also creates a contingency fund that the Forest Service can
access, with presidential approval, for emergency fire suppression. This effectively puts
the Forest Service back into the blank-check mode.
• 1990–1994: Timber sales fall from 11 billion to 3 billion board feet per year, leading
many people to wonder what will replace timber as the dominant part of the Forest
Service budget. One Forest Service chief suggests that the agency’s new mission should
be “ecosystem management.” Others suggest that recreation could replace timber, but
Congress shows little enthusiasm for either of those ideas.
• 1994: Fourteen firefighters die in a Colorado fire. The Forest Service responds by using
more backburning to stop fires, again trading off more acres burned to improve fire-
fighter safety.16
• 2000: A prescribed fire lit on New Mexico’s Bandelier National Monument escapes. The
Forest Service effectively suppresses it with a backburn, but the backburn itself escapes
and destroys a billion dollars worth of homes in Los Alamos. Congress responds by giv-
ing the Forest Service a 38 percent increase in its budget and directing the Forest Service
and the Department of the Interior to write a National Fire Plan. Not surprisingly, the
resulting plan calls for increased spending on hazardous fuel reduction and presup-
pression.
• 2002: Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon have the largest fires in their recorded histories. 
• 2003: Congress passes the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, giving the Forest Service the
authority to spend more money on hazardous fuels and to design timber sales that
require the purchaser to do hazardous fuel reduction in lieu of part of the payment for
timber. 
• 2007: Fire has clearly become, once again, the Forest Service’s raison d’être, as it now
contributes more to the agency’s budget than timber ever did.
there are two. One, the emergency suppression
account, covers expenses attributable to actual
fires. The other, the emergency presuppression
account, pays for personal services and rentals
during selective periods of high fire danger.”
Pyne continues, “What happens, of course, is
that everything imaginable is charged to fires,
and the determination of ‘high fire danger’ be-
comes more and more loosely interpreted.”17
On the recommendation of the Office of
Management and Budget, Congress formally
repealed the blank-check law in 1978, and for
a few years the Forest Service managed to
restrain its fire spending. But severe fires in
1987 and 1988 forced the Forest Service fire
program to borrow heavily from the agency’s
revolving reforestation fund. The Forest
Service asked Congress to reimburse that
fund so that it would have money for refor-
estation. Congress did so, and further created
a contingency fund that fire managers could
draw upon in emergencies.
Congress’s actions, in effect, created a vir-
tual blank check. While funds now went
through the appropriations process, Forest
Service managers knew that they could draw
from a huge contingency fund and, when
that ran out, borrow from the revolving
reforestation fund, and Congress would
reimburse the fund. That greatly relaxed any
restraints the Forest Service had placed on
spending.
“Emergency funding for firefighting lacks
the rigor, discipline, and incentives for more
efficient decision making,” reported the USDA
in 2000. “The Forest Service manages emer-
gency firefighting funds as if they are unbudg-
eted, unlimited, unallocated, and without
benchmarks on acceptable spending levels.”18
As if, in other words, it had a blank check.
“Corruption” implies something illegal or
at least highly unethical, and such corrup-
tion does exist. In 2006 prosecutors accused a
Forest Service purchasing agent of writing
her boyfriend $642,000 in checks out of fire-
fighting accounts. Because that was just a
tiny share of the roughly $1 billion spent on
firefighting each year, she was able to easily
cover up the theft and was caught only when
someone tipped off the local prosecutor that
she and her boyfriend were living beyond
their means.19
For the most part, however, the “corrup-
tion” is a corruption of attitudes. Everyone
from top fire commanders to rookie fire-
fighters knows that funds for firefighting are
virtually unlimited, and they don’t hesitate
to spend that money. A 2003 internal Forest
Service audit found that firefighters used
emergency suppression funds to purchase
carpeting for their camps and digital cam-
eras, tents, and designer clothing for them-
selves.20 The audit also found that firefight-
ing forces “totally ignored” spending rules
and continued to operate as if they had a
blank check 25 years after Congress formally
repealed the blank-check law.21
The corruption of the truth is just as seri-
ous as out-of-control budgets. In the early
20th century, a growing body of research
showed that some forests, particularly in the
South, needed frequent light fires both to
promote the reforestation and growth of
desired species and to prevent a buildup of
hazardous fuels. But the Forest Service was
so strongly rewarded by the blank check for
fire suppression that for several decades it
actively opposed anyone who proposed pre-
scribed burning and suppressed the findings
of its own researchers that supported such
burning.22
“Sanctified by an administrative theory
granting zealous technocrats broad latitude
for action, purpose was transmuted into mis-
sion, a campaign into a crusade,” wrote
Ashley Schiff in his classic 1962 book on
Forest Service fire policy, Fire and Water. “In
the field of fire protection, as one critic of
Forest Service policy remarked, ‘twenty years
or so of iteration and auto-suggestion has
made of complete fire protection, in all cir-
cumstances and regardless of conditions, not
a theory but a religion, an idée fixe,’ Ignoring
early caveats, the Service tragically slipped
into a rut from which escape proved difficult
and embarrassing. Thus had evangelism sub-
verted a scientific program, impaired profes-














responsibility, undermined the democratic
faith, and threatened the piney woods with
ultimate extinction.”23
In order to promote fire protection on
state and private lands, Congress in 1924
authorized the Forest Service to offer funds
to local fire protection districts. But, condi-
tioned by the blank-check law, the agency was
so prejudiced against prescribed fires that it
refused to sanction fire protection districts
that allowed their members to use light burn-
ing in southern longleaf pine until 1943 and
loblolly pine until 1954. During that time,
many landowners in the South refused to
form or join such districts. In response, the
Forest Service recorded all prescribed fires on
their lands as wildfires. 
Forest Service fire statistics from that era
show that about 1 percent of acres in fire pro-
tection districts burned each year, while
about 10 percent of acres in unprotected
areas burned per year.24 That allowed the
Forest Service to claim that the fire protec-
tion districts were a huge success when in
fact most of the acres burned in unprotected
areas were prescribed fires. When southern
landowners finally joined fire protection dis-
tricts in the 1950s, the number of acres
reported as wildfires dropped dramatically.
“By the late 1950s, as a result of increasingly
sophisticated fire protection, suppression,
and public education, both the area burned
and size of fires had been substantially
reduced,” says a Forest Service historian.25 In
fact, most if not all of the decline was due to
the Forest Service no longer reporting pre-
scribed fires as wildfires.
History is repeating itself today as the
Forest Service distorts its own research and
other scientific information about fire ecolo-
gy to justify huge budgets for hazardous
fuels reduction and fire suppression. As the
next section of this paper will show, the claim
that a century of fire suppression has left
most western forests highly vulnerable to fire
is greatly exaggerated, which means that
much of the billions of dollars that the Forest




After Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon each
experienced record-breaking fires in 2002, the
Forest Service wrote a paper asking, “Why so
many large fires?” To answer that question, the
paper quoted a 1999 General Accounting Office
report that said, “The most extensive and seri-
ous problem related to health of national forests
in the interior West is the over-accumulation of
vegetation, which has caused an increasing
number of large, intense, uncontrollable and
catastrophically destructive wildfires.”26
The first clue that something is wrong
with this is that the Forest Service—suppos-
edly the nation’s experts on forests and wild-
fire—is quoting the General Accounting
Office, whose middle name was, after all,
“accounting,” not “firefighting.”27 Where did
the GAO get its information? Why, from the
Forest Service, of course. That circular attri-
bution hints that there may be something
self-serving in the fuels theory.
As further support for the excess-fuels
hypothesis, the Forest Service gave Congress a
series of photos taken of a ponderosa pine for-
est in Montana. The first photo, taken in
1909, supposedly shows the forest in its “nat-
ural” state before years of fire suppression. The
last photo, taken in 1979, shows the same for-
est after decades of fire suppression allowed
vegetation to accumulate. The only problem is
that the first photo clearly shows tree stumps,
so it is hardly a natural forest. Keith Hammer
tracked down a photo of the same site before
any timber cutting, which showed a dense for-
est of trees underlain by waist-high grass and
shrubs. The Forest Service had excluded that
photo from the series it showed to Congress.28
There is a grain of truth behind the excess-
fuels hypothesis. But the problem is nowhere
near as serious as the Forest Service claims.
Fire ecologists have identified five different fire
regimes in various forests in the United States:
I. Low-severity fires every 1 to 35 years,

















III. Mixed-severity fires every 35 to 100
years,
IV. High-severity fires every 35 to 100
years, and
V. High-severity fires every 101 or more
years.29
Only forests in regime I are likely to suffer
catastrophic fires if fires are excluded for many
years. It is possible that fire exclusion could
also create problems in regime III. But the
other three regimes are not going to be altered
by fire exclusion. “We expect fuel-reduction
treatments in high-elevation forests [regimes
IV or V] to be generally unsuccessful in reduc-
ing fire frequency, severity, and size, given the
overriding importance of extreme climate in
controlling fire regimes in this zone,” say fire
ecologists in a 2004 paper in BioScience. More-
over, fuel treatments in those forests may actu-
ally do more harm than good. “A ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach to reducing wildfire hazards in
the Rocky Mountain region is unlikely to be
effective and may produce collateral damage
in some places.”30
Forest Service researchers estimate that 90
percent of national forests in the South fall
into the first regime, which is why landown-
ers there have long supported light or pre-
scribed burning.31 But less than 38 percent of
western national forest lands, mainly pon-
derosa pine and Sierra Nevada mixed-conifer
forests, fall into this category, which means
that far fewer western forests have the poten-
tial to develop serious fuel hazards.32
Some ecologists believe the Forest Service
has overestimated the extent of regime I in the
West, saying that not all ponderosa pine
forests should be included in this regime. On
the basis of extensive fieldwork, University of
Wyoming researcher William Baker found
that the natural fire intervals in many of those
forests are less frequent than previously
assumed.33 Baker concluded that removing
fuels to reduce fire risk “does not have a sound
scientific basis” unless managers know for cer-
tain that natural fire histories were more fre-
quent.34
Some scientists disagree with Baker’s inter-
pretation of fire frequencies.35 But research by
Forest Service scientists also found that “mixed
severity fires [typical of fire regime III] were . . .
more common than expected in the dry forests”
that had been included in fire regime I.36 The
study concluded that previous inclusion of
those forests in regime I was based on erroneous
sampling techniques.
The latest word in this debate comes in a
2006 paper, coauthored by Baker and four
other prominent ecologists, that provides an
overview of research on fire ecology in the
West. Because hazardous fuel programs make
sense only in fire regime I, “current forest law
does not adequately incorporate ecological
considerations in its implementation,” say
the ecologists, “and tends to promote a nar-
row definition of restoration that focuses
almost exclusively on fuels.”37
Whatever the extent of regime I, Forest
Service ecologists divide those forests into
three condition classes, or estimates of how much
natural fire conditions have been altered by fire
suppression and other forms of management.
Condition class 1 is relatively unaltered, class 2
has moderate alterations, and class 3 forests
have been significantly altered and are at high
risk.38 Only 15.5 percent of western national
forests are both in fire regime I and condition
class 3.39 This indicates that hazardous fuels
are not a serious issue on nearly 85 percent of
western national forests. One reason for that is,
as previously noted, Forest Service fire suppres-
sion efforts were not really very effective before
the introduction of aerial firefighting tools in
the 1950s.
The 15.5 percent where fuels may be a
problem amount to about 24 million acres.
Many of those acres are remote, and fires
might do little damage to valuable resources.
In fact, in many cases letting fires burn on
those acres could help restore natural fire
regimes. Still, some of those acres are located
near homes and other structures as more
people have built in what the Forest Service
calls the wildland-urban interface, or WUI. 
The Forest Service estimates that 98 mil-
lion acres are in the wildland-urban interface,
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but fewer than 8 million of those acres belong
to the Forest Service or other federal agencies.
Nearly 80 percent of the federal acres and 94
percent of the nonfederal acres are in condi-
tion class 1, meaning there is little or no fuel
hazard. Less than 6 percent of the federal acres
and only 1.6 percent of the nonfederal acres
are in condition class 3, meaning a significant
potential fuel hazard (and then mainly if they
are in fire regime 1).40
In short, if protecting homes and other
structures is the goal, only a few million acres
need treatment, most of which are nonfeder-
al land. Moreover, according to Forest Service
researcher Jack Cohen, the best treatment is
to ensure that structures have nonflammable
roofs and that thick vegetation and woody
debris are cleared from about 130 feet
around the buildings. 
“Wildland fuel reduction for reducing
home losses may be inefficient and ineffec-
tive,” says Cohen; “inefficient because wild-
land fuel reduction for several 100 meters or
more around homes is greater than necessary
for reducing ignition from flames; ineffective
because it does not sufficiently reduce fire-
brand ignitions [which are eliminated only
by nonflammable roofs].”41
Despite this, the Forest Service has not
focused its hazardous fuel programs on these
lands. A 2006 report from the USDA’s inspec-
tor general charged that the Forest Service
does “not ensure that the highest priority fuels
reduction projects are being implemented.”42
In response, the Forest Service is putting more
effort into fuel reduction in national forests in
the wildland-urban interface, but it is still not
targeting the lands within 130 feet of struc-
tures and is making little effort to ensure that
all structures are roofed with nonflammable
materials.
If fuels are not the huge problem the Forest
Service claims, then what is the explanation for
recent large fires and record fire seasons? A
recent article in Science concluded that the rea-
son was drought, not fuels. The authors stud-
ied fire data since 1970 and found that the
greatest increases in fires have been in fire
regimes III, IV, and V, “where land-use histories
have relatively little effect on fire risks.” Instead
of fuels, they found a strong correlation
between drought and fire. “Thus, although
land-use history is an important factor for wild-
fire risks in specific forest types (such as some
ponderosa pine and mixed conifer forests), the
broad-scale increase in wildfire frequency across
the western United States has been driven pri-
marily by sensitivity of fire regimes to recent
changes in climate over a relatively large area.”43
Similar correlations between drought and fire
have been found going back to 1931.44
Another explanation for the large fires in
recent years can be found in the changes in fire-
fighting strategies aimed at improving fire-
fighter safety. To fight large fires, incident com-
manders often backburn tens of thousands of
acres in an effort to create large firebreaks that
wildfires cannot cross. One study of the Biscuit
fire, the largest fire in Oregon history, estimat-
ed that 30 percent of the acres were burned by
backburns, not the natural fire.45
All of this research—some of it done by
Forest Service scientists—indicates that Forest
Service leaders have greatly exaggerated the
excess-fuels problem. By concentrating on this
issue, they have deftly persuaded Congress to
increase funding for hazardous fuel reduction
in national forests from less than $8 million in
1992 to nearly $300 million in 2007. 
Meanwhile, because of the perceived threat
of hazardous fuels, Congress has increased
funding for presuppression (which the Forest
Service now calls preparation) from less than
$180 million per year in the early 1990s to
more than $650 million per year since 2004.
Despite—or perhaps because of—all this
preparation, the Forest Service managed to
spend a record amount of money on suppres-
sion in 2006, and it has spent three times as
much on suppression in the last five years as it
did in the first five years of the 1990s.
The Institutional
Conundrum
The biggest problem with fire today is not





goal, only a few
million acres
need treatment,
most of which are
nonfederal land. 
and the public about fuel hazards or that
some fire funds are misspent in the haste of
emergency suppression efforts. It is that nei-
ther Congress nor the Forest Service has any
idea how to stop fire costs from spiraling ever
higher.
Whenever a national forest wildfire threat-
ens someone’s home, members of Congress go
on television and promise to increase the
Forest Service budget so that such threats
never happen again. In 2006 a senator from
Montana sharply criticized the Forest Service
for allowing fires to burn grass that might
have fed a few subsidized cows grazing in the
national forests.46
Members of Congress greeted the presi-
dent’s 2008 Forest Service budget proposal
with incredulity. The budget allocated $911
million to fire suppression, 23 percent more
than in 2007 and far more than in any prior
year. Yet Rep. Norm Dicks (D-WA) called this
“a very unworkable budget,” and Rep. David
Obey (D-WI) called it a “‘let’s pretend’ budg-
et” because they felt even more money should
be spent on fire.47
In contrast to congressional pushes to in-
crease fire spending, the Forest Service has
undertaken numerous cost-containment ef-
forts. One study suggests that Forest Service
fire commanders tend to spend too much on
direct suppression when other alternatives
should be considered.48 According to a USDA
inspector general’s audit, “the majority of FS
large fire suppression costs are directly linked to
protecting private property in the WUI.” The
audit recommends that state and local govern-
ments be asked to pay more of those costs.
There is a widespread belief among fire
ecologists that more fires should be allowed
to burn in the national forests. That would
not only help restore natural ecological con-
ditions and fire regimes, it would reduce sup-
pression costs.
Yet fire commanders know that the criti-
cism they might face for spending too much
money to suppress a fire is nothing com-
pared to the firestorm of criticism they will
face if they allow a fire to escape and burn
something valuable such as homes or other
structures. Although most national forests
today have fire plans that theoretically pro-
vide for letting fires burn (though generally
only in wilderness areas), forest managers let
less than 0.4 percent of all fires burn in 2006. 
Fire managers do not lose their jobs for
pouring massive resources into fire suppres-
sion, or even for burning down someone’s
home if it is done in the course of a backfire
aimed at stopping a wildfire. But some man-
agers have lost their jobs (or were transferred
to other jobs) after starting prescribed fires or
letting wildfires burn that accidentally
spread onto private land.
In addition to Congress and the Forest
Service, a new player has entered the field:
firefighting companies. The Forest Service
once directly employed all its own firefight-
ers; today it increasingly hires firefighters
employed by private firms, not to mention
airplanes, helicopters, and other equipment.
This “fire-industrial complex,” as some have
called it, certainly promotes more spending
on fire suppression.
The Forest Service once had a positive
image and produced positive things such as
wood for homebuilders; scenic beauty for
recreationists; fish and wildlife for anglers,
hunters, and birdwatchers; and clean water
for many of the West’s thirsty cities. Now that
fire control dominates the agency’s budget, it
has a negative image as the agency that
screwed up the forests by letting fuels build
up and a negative mission: “We didn’t burn
your house down last year, and if you give us
a lot more money, we’ll try not to burn it
down again this year.” Although national for-
est managers appreciate the money that fire
has brought to their forests, many are dis-
turbed by this negative mission and by the
fear that there is no end to spiraling fire costs.
Despite the growing body of evidence that
hazardous fuels are a serious issue in only a
small share of western national forests, top
Forest Service officials continue to make inap-
propriate promises to Congress about the
benefits of fuel treatments. “While wildland
fire is an element of natural ecosystem












posal, “catastrophic wildland fire is not.”49
That may be true in fire regime I, but it is cer-
tainly not true in fire regimes II through V,
where catastrophic or stand-replacement fires
are the norm. Yet in making this statement,
the Forest Service is effectively promising to
reduce or eliminate such fires if Congress gives
it enough money for fuel treatments—another
promise it will not be able to keep.
Solving the fire conundrum will require a
fundamental restructuring of the agency.
That restructuring should reduce the Forest
Service’s dependence on Congress, for so long
as the agency requires federal funds, members
of Congress will have an incentive to deal with
fire problems by throwing money at them. It
should also decentralize decisionmaking as
much as possible, so that one-size-fits-all poli-
cies are replaced with policies that best meet
local needs.
Alternative Solutions
There may be no single solution to the fire
problem, as the actual nature of the problem
varies so much from one region of the United
States to another. Here I will present six alter-
natives, one or more of which may offer the
most practical solution in different parts of
the nation.
Alternative 1: Cost Containment
This is the Forest Service’s current direction
and consists of efforts to better train firefight-
ers and fire commanders to ensure that they
keep expenditures within appropriate bounds.
In 2005 Congress required the Forest Service to
identify the “most cost-effective alternative” for
dealing with each fire and to report the per-
centage of fires for which that alternative was
adopted.50 But this is little more than another
piece of red tape that is likely to increase, not
reduce, firefighting costs.
The cost-containment alternative does
nothing to change the basic incentives shared
by Congress, the Forest Service, and the fire-
industrial complex to spend more money on
fire each year regardless of the effectiveness
of that spending. For that reason, this alter-
native will do little more than tinker with the
edges of the problem.
Alternative 2: Focus on WUI
If, as the USDA inspector general says,
most fire-suppression efforts aim to protect
homes and other structures in the wildland-
urban interface, then costs can be reduced by
changing the way that interface is managed.
Since Jack Cohen’s research indicates that
structures can be fireproofed by roofing them
with nonflammable materials and clearing
excess vegetation and other flammables with-
in 130 feet of the structures, the Forest Service
could focus its fuel-treatment efforts on those
areas rather than on its own lands. 
The agency could inform homeowners
about how to keep their properties fire safe
and encourage insurance companies to offer
discounted rates to homeowners who do so
(or higher rates to those who don’t). Until
recently, the insurance industry has ignored
problems in the wildland-urban interface
because (thanks in part to the Forest Service’s
willingness to spend millions to protect
homes that may only be worth thousands)
only a tiny proportion of homes burned each
year are in the interface. That is already chang-
ing, as a few companies are beginning to offer
discounts to people who keep their properties
fire safe.
Although it is unlikely that Congress would
stand for a policy of letting homes burn if they
don’t comply with fire-safe rules, the Forest
Service should seriously consider whether it
would be less expensive to simply let homes
burn than to spend millions trying to suppress
fires. Beyond this, Forest Service fuel treat-
ments could focus on creating a fuel break
between national forests and adjacent private
land, so the agency can let many if not most
fires burn within national forest boundaries.
Alternative 3: Insurance
Congress could appropriate a fixed amount
of fire suppression funds each year. Rather than
rely on the blank check to fund fire suppression
when costs exceed that amount, national
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forests could buy insurance. The state of
Oregon once relied on a system like this, pur-
chasing insurance from Lloyd’s of London for
years when fire costs exceeded a fixed amount.
The insurance companies would monitor
national forest spending and give forest man-
agers incentives to find the most cost-effective
ways of keeping that spending down.
One problem would be whether the global
insurance industry can take on this large a job;
Lloyd’s canceled Oregon’s insurance after the
2002 fire season. Although the Forest Service
has spent more than $1 billion on fire sup-
pression in four of the last seven years, if insur-
ance were possible, it is likely that suppression
costs would be much lower in the future.
Alternative 4: Turn Firefighting Duties
over to the States
State and local fire protection districts
fund their activities out of fees collected from
landowners in the districts. Although each
state is different, the typical district charges a
basic per acre fee with additional fees charged
for structures. This money is pooled and
used to suppress fires.
In some cases, federal agencies join these dis-
tricts rather than operate their own fire sup-
pression programs. For example, the Bureau of
Land Management pays a per acre fee to fire
protection districts in western Oregon. In this
case, the Oregon legislature matches the fees
paid by private landowners, but not the BLM,
so the BLM per acre fees are actually twice those
charged to private landowners.
Under this alternative, the Forest Service
would turn over its firefighting resources to
the states, and each national forest would
join state or local fire protection districts
using an appropriate local formula. All
preparation and suppression costs would be
paid by the states out of those fees. Forest
managers might still be expected to reduce
hazardous fuels, but such programs could be
negotiated with each local district.
Alternative 5: Forest Trusts
Congress has historically provided fund-
ing to state and local fire protection districts
via the Forest Service. So turning the fire-
fighting duties over to the states may only
transfer the blank check from a federal
bureaucracy to state bureaucracies.
As an alternative, each national forest
could be made into an independent forest
trust that would be funded exclusively out of
its own revenues.51 Although the federal gov-
ernment would retain title to the forests, each
forest would be independently operated under
the supervision of a board of directors that
was either appointed or elected by a “friends of
the forest” group. Forests could earn revenue
from timber, grazing, mining, recreation, and
other activities and would be allowed to keep a
fixed share of all those revenues for forest
operations. Some share of the revenues might
be allocated to a separate trust that would pro-
mote the production of nonmarket resources
such as endangered species habitat.
The forest trusts would be free to pool their
resources to deal with fire and other regional
problems. Some forests might elect to contract
fire protection to the state, while others might
maintain their own fire suppression resources
or contract them out to private operators. 
This alternative would give forest managers
incentives to develop fire policies that respond
primarily to local conditions and not to a cen-
tralized budgetary process. Because this alter-
native would completely divorce Congress
from forest budgeting, there would be no cen-
tralized pressure to overspend on fire suppres-
sion in order to protect low-valued resources
such as grass.
Alternative 6: Abolish the Forest Service
Robert Nelson’s book, A Burning Issue,
argues that the Forest Service’s inability to
solve the fire problem shows that the agency
should be abolished and the national forests
turned over to the states or privatized.52 This
alternative goes a step beyond the trust alter-
native by completely severing any direct link
between the federal government and the
forests. In doing so, it would accomplish the
objectives of decentralizing decisions and














National forests are located in 40 states, and
other federal lands such as national parks can
be found in almost all the other states. Because
of the wide range of ecological, social, and eco-
nomic conditions, there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to the fire problem on federal lands.
Any attempt to deal with the problem must
give land managers incentives to respond to
local conditions rather than to national politi-
cal concerns or budgetary issues.
It is not clear which of the six alternatives
described above will provide the best solution
to out-of-control fire budgets, or even if any
one of those six might be the best solution
for all federal lands. Accordingly, Congress
should experiment with the alternatives by
testing each on one or more national forests.
Such experiments could be evaluated after
several years to see which alternative or alter-
natives best resolve local fire issues at the
most reasonable cost to taxpayers.
Unless Congress is willing to consider
such innovative ideas, the Forest Service’s fire
program will continue to grow at an unsus-
tainable rate. That will prove costly both to
taxpayers and to national forest ecosystems.
Congress should address this issue now,
before the problem becomes too big to fix.
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